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Abstract—When showing that a software system meets certain
security requirements, it is often necessary to work with formal
and informal descriptions of the system behavior, vulnerabilities,
and the threats from potential attackers. In earlier work, Haley
et al. [4] showed structured argumentation could deal with
such mixed descriptions. However, incomplete and uncertain
information, and limited resources force practitioners to settle for
good-enough security. To deal with these conditions of practice,
we extend the method of Haley et al. with risk assessment.
The proposed method, RISA (RIsk assessment in Security Argu-
mentation), uses public catalogs of security expertise to support
the risk assessment, and to guide the security argumentation in
identifying rebuttals and mitigations for security requirements
satisfaction. We illustrate RISA with a realistic example of PIN
Entry Device.
Index Terms—Security Requirements, Argumentation, Risk
Assessment, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classifi-
cation (CAPEC), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
I. INTRODUCTION
Structures of argumentation, such as those proposed by
Toulmin et al. [1], provide an effective way to organize knowl-
edge when convincing an audience about a claim. They have
been used in many ways including to build safety cases [2],
to demonstrate compliance to laws and regulations [3], and
to show security requirements satisfaction [4]. Depending
on the nature of the claim, arguments can be built upon
observable and measurable evidence, such as the frequency
of system failures, defects detected by code analysis tools
and developers’ certification records. Engineering of secure
systems has many practical limitations, including incomplete
knowledge about potential attackers, uncertainties about the
system context, limited resources and different trade-off agen-
das. All in all, security is a non-zero-sum game between
defenders and attackers of a system. Absolute security is
usually not feasible, if at all possible. Argumentation works
well in conditions of complete information and sufficient
resources, but when one of these are lacking it needs to
be supplemented with risk assessment techniques that allow
for uncertainty and incompleteness of available evidence,
and allow partial application when resources are limited. It
facilitates the achievement of practical security: “good enough
satisfaction” of security requirements within an “as low as
reasonably practicable” [5] level of risk.
Haley et al. [4] have already suggested, but not elaborated,
the need to relate argumentation and risk assessment for
security. Extending that work, we present the RISA (RIsk-
based Security Argumentation) method, which takes advan-
tage of public catalogs of security expertise and empirical
evidences, in particular, the CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification), and the CWE (Common
Weakness Enumeration) catalogs. The aims of RISA are to:
1) identify the risks to the satisfaction of security require-
ments;
2) differentiate between the risks that should be mitigated
by the system context and the risks that should be
mitigated by the system;
3) analyze those risks to be mitigated by the system and
prioritize the risks found through arguments.
The main contribution of this paper is a systematic approach
to assessing the risks associated with security arguments. This
approach enables requirements engineers to make informed
decisions about the implications of security risks, and how the
system could maintain a good-enough level of security satis-
faction. Our approach is different from other risk assessment
frameworks in several ways. First, our approach uses security
arguments, derived from a systematic description of the system
context and a formal reasoning about the satisfaction of the se-
curity requirements (known as “outer arguments”), as top-level
structure of risk assessment. Second, RISA treats assumptions
made in the arguments as a major source of risks, mitigation
of which is a responsibility to be discharged either by the
software or the system context. Third, the approach makes
extensive use of publicly available catalogs on security risks,
and mechanisms to mitigate risks. These evolving catalogs
reflect the changing nature of security threats, and provide
a valuable source of knowledge to requirements engineers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces our running example, the PIN Entry Device (PED)
case study. Section III provides some background discussion
on security requirements satisfaction, argumentation, and the
security catalogs CAPEC and CWE that support the RISA
method. Section IV presents the RISA method, describes the
role played by argumentation and risk assessment, and lists its
steps. Section V demonstrates the RISA steps using the PED
example. Section VI discusses the method and reviews related
work, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY: PIN ENTRY DEVICE
PIN Entry Device (PED) is a type of device widely-
deployed and used by consumers to pay for goods with debit
or credit smartcards at the Points-Of-Sales (POS).
When using the device, cardholders typically insert their
cards, issued by a financial institution, into a card-reader
interface of the PED, enter the PIN using the PED’s key-
pad, and confirm the transaction value via a display on the
PED itself. Then smartcard-based systems are expected to
authenticate cardholders via the PIN and verify the card
details against a public-key certificate before transactions can
complete with success. These certificates are usually stored
on the chip, but they can also be stored on the magnetic strip
for compatibility with card-readers that have not adopted this
technology. Most PEDs used in Europe implement the EMV
(EuroPay, MasterCard and Visa) protocol in the process of
authentication and authorization of payment transactions. This
protocol drives the communication between PED-card and
PED-bank, and in principle allows only encrypted transmission
of PIN across these interfaces when PED, card and bank
support asymmetric cryptography. However, many card issuers
adopt a low-cost EMV option in their smartcards that can be
triggered to transmit unencrypted PIN on the interface PED-
card.
Drimer et al. [6] studied two popular PEDs produced
by different manufacturers, and evaluated either under the
Visa evaluation scheme [7] or under the Common Criteria
evaluation scheme [8]. The PEDs were found to be vulnerable
to unsophisticated attacks in practice, and the authors have
drawn lessons from this not only related to the evaluation
process [6], [9] but also related to the software development
life cycle. Throughout this paper, we will use this non-trivial
example to explain and to motivate the RISA method.
III. BACKGROUND
The RISA method relies on two main concepts proposed
by Haley et al. [4]: the notion of the satisfaction of security
requirements, and the use of outer and inner arguments to
demonstrate the system security. This section recaps those
concepts, and discusses the security catalogs used by the RISA
method.
A. Satisfaction of Security Requirements
Following the WSR principle of the Problem Frames ap-
proach [10], the framework of Haley et al. separates software
artifacts into W , S and R, where W represents a description
of the world in which the software is to be used (i.e., the
system context), S represents the specification of a system,
and R represents a description of the requirements. The main
property of these artifacts is that the software within the system
context should satisfy the requirements, as indicated by the
following entailment:
W,S ` R (1)
Similar to the Problem Frames approach, the framework of
Haley et al. describes the world context W in terms of domains
(short for problem world domains), elements of the world that
can be either tangible (such as people, other systems, and
hardware) or intangible (such as software and data structure).
Typically, W also contains assumptions made about those
domains. Domains interface with each other and with the
system S via shared phenomena (such as events, states and
values) that are controlled by a domain and are visible to some
other domain(s).
In the framework of Haley et al, security requirements
are constraints on functional requirements that protect the
assets from identified harms. For example, in the requirement
“Provide Human Resource (HR) data requested by the user,
only to HR staff”, providing HR data to users making the
requests is regarded as a functional requirement, and ensuring
that only those requests from members of HR staff are fulfilled
is regarded as a constraint on the functional requirement, thus
a security requirement. Security requirements are part of R in
the entailment (1). Therefore, satisfaction of security require-
ments, spelled out in security arguments, show (i) whether
properties of W and S entail the security requirements, and
(ii) whether assumptions in W and S are correct.
B. Security Arguments of Haley et al. Framework
The framework of Haley et al. distinguishes two kinds of
arguments for satisfaction of security requirements.
1) Outer arguments: The outer arguments show whether
properties of W and S entail the security requirements. These
arguments are typically expressed in a formal language, such
as the propositional logic. Therefore, outer arguments are
proofs of the entailment (1) for security requirements. This
is expressed as follows:
(domain behavior premises) ` (security requirement(s))
(2)
Outer arguments rely on properties of W and S (domain
behavior premises), some of which may turn out to be incor-
rect assumptions. Those premises need to be challenged, and
be grounded in facts if possible, or taken as true, for instance,
on the basis of a lack of contrary evidence.
2) Inner arguments: The general purpose of an inner argu-
ment is to try to rebut the outer arguments by questioning their
premises. Notice that the outer arguments establish the scope
of security assessment, whilst the inner arguments deepen the
assessment. The framework of Haley et al. uses Toulmin-style
structures, enhanced with the notion of recursiveness from
Newman et al. [11], for inner arguments. The general structure
of inner arguments used in the framework of Haley et al. is
shown in Fig. 1.
A claim is the object of an argument, what one wishes to
convince the audience of. A ground is an evidence, a fact, a
theory, a phenomenon considered to be true. A warrant is a
statement that links a ground and a claim, showing how a claim
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Fig. 1. Structure of arguments used in the framework of Haley et al. [4]
is justified by ground(s). A rebuttal is a counterargument
which reduces support to the claim. Specifically in the case
of security-related argumentation, rebuttals represent the risks
that the claim of an argument is false. Rebuttals can be
mitigated in order to restore the confidence that the claim of
the rebutted argument is true. A mitigation, while negating
a rebuttal, may introduce additional knowledge to show that
the rebuttal, i.e. a risk, can somehow be tolerated. Therefore,
mitigations address risks but may not necessarily eliminate the
risks, and residual risks may remain. Moreover, mitigations
may also introduce new risks, leading to new rounds of
rebuttals and mitigations in argumentation.
C. Relationship between Outer and Inner Arguments
Fig. 2 shows how outer and inner arguments are related:
the formal outer argument provides the main structure that
drives the inner argumentation. Each of the outer argument
premises (a→ b) is a seed for one thread of inner arguments,
where a is the ground and b is the claim to be challenged be
examining the ground a and the implication →. Each round
of inner argumentation is indicated by the notation R |Mr.n,
where R stands for Risk and M for Mitigation, r indicates
the round and n represents a sequential number.
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Fig. 2. Relationship between outer and inner arguments
In Section IV, we contrast the process of argumentation
used in the framework of Haley et al. with our new approach
proposed by the RISA method.
D. Public Catalogs of Security Expertise
The National Cyber Security Division of the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security has a strategic initiative to
promote software assurance. Two projects under this initiative
are particularly useful for the RISA method, namely, CAPEC
and CWE1.
1Their websites, http://cwe.mitre.org/ and http://capec.mitre.org/, are both
sponsored and managed by the Mitre Corporation.
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) is a publicly available catalog of known at-
tacks, described according to a standard schema [12]. The
CAPEC catalog2, contains 460 entries, classified according
to different views and categories. Complete CAPEC en-
tries provide not only information about attack execution
flow, methods of attack, attack prerequisites, and attacker
skills/knowledge/resources required, but also about typical
severity, and generic solutions and mitigations. In addition,
complete entries in CAPEC also provide pointers to specific
weaknesses (“underlying issues that may cause vulnerabil-
ities” [12]), i.e. to CWE(s), and to concrete examples of
vulnerabilities which have been detected in use (these are CVE
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure) entries recorded in
the National Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov/)).
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a public catalog
of weaknesses3, where each weakness can either become a
direct source of vulnerabilities, or contribute indirectly to an
increase of the likelihood of an attack to happen and/or an
increase of the impact of the attack, if it succeeds [12]. It
also follows a standard schema [13], providing different views,
groupings and relations with other weaknesses, as well as
pointers to CAPEC and CVE entries. Complete CWEs indi-
cate common consequences, likelihood of exploit, detection
methods and potential mitigations at different phases, such
as Requirements and Architecture/Design. The RISA method
uses CAPEC and CWE as sources for security knowledge,
making the analysis of risks more systematic, repeatable, and
less dependent on subjective judgments.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE RISA METHOD
As shown in Fig. 3 the RISA (RIsk assessment in Security
Argumentation) method extends the process of argumentation
for security requirements proposed in the Haley et al frame-
work by incorporating a process of risks assessment.
Steps 1 to 3 of the proposed approach are same as the first
three steps of the framework of Haley et al., and are briefly
summarized below.
A. Step 1 to Step 3
In Step 1 (Identify Functional Requirements), functional
requirements of the system and the system context (domains
and shared phenomena) are identified. These requirements may
be derived from the higher-level goals of the system. In Step
2 (Identify Security Goals), assets that need to be protected,
management principles regarding those assets, and security
goals are identified. In Step 3 (Identify Security Require-
ments), security requirements are derived from security goals,
and are expressed as constraints on the functional requirements
identified in Step 1. Problem diagrams are constructed in this
step.
2http://capec.mitre.org/data/, version 1.6., accessed on 21 Feb 2011
3http://cwe.mitre.org/data/, version 1.11., accessed on 21 Feb, 2011
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Fig. 3. Schematic overview of the RISA method
B. Step 4: Construct Outer Arguments
Unlike the fourth step of the Haley et al framework, only
the outer arguments for security requirements (excluding the
inner arguments) are constructed in Step 4 of RISA. These
outer arguments are formal, and they make use of domain
properties, correctness of which is examined by inner argu-
ments. Behavioral premises used in the outer arguments may
represent risks, which are identified using a systematic risks
assessment process in RISA. This is represented in the figure
by the arrow from Step 4 to Step 5.
Steps 5 to 8 correspond with the process of constructing
inner arguments in the Haley et al framework. These four
steps show how domain assumptions in outer arguments are
challenged by means of risks assessment based on public
security catalogs.
C. Step 5: Identify Risks
In this step, behavioral premises in outer arguments regard-
ing the domains (arrow from Step 4 to Step 5 in Fig. 3) are
identified as potential risks. For instance, in the PED example,
there could be a behavioral premise about the confidentiality
of PIN entered using the keypad. Public security catalogs are
then searched to find known security weaknesses regarding the
confidentiality of passwords entered using a keypad.
D. Step 6: Classify Risks
The risks are classified into two groups. In one group are
risks transferred to the context because nothing can be done
by the system to mitigate them. In the PED example, the con-
fidentiality of the PIN (one of the PED security requirements)
depends on cards having certain cryptographic capabilities.
Although the PED can generally comply with this demand,
there is still the risk that the card will not comply. Therefore,
the obligation to mitigate this risk is transferred either partially
or fully to the card. In the other group are risks that should
be mitigated by the system. In the PED example, integrity
of PIN over the network has to be ensured by the system.
Classification and transferring of obligations to mitigate risks
to the system and its context could modify the behavior and
properties of the domains and shared phenomena, and perhaps
even the functional requirements (as indicated by the arrow
from Step 6 and Step 1). As a result of these changes, outer
arguments may be rebutted.
E. Step 7: Mitigate Risks
Appropriate security mechanisms for mitigating the risks
are searched in the public security catalogs (arrow from the
catalogs to Step 7). Some of these mechanisms themselves
could introduce new risks and therefore should be assessed in
a new round of inner argumentation (arrow from Step 7 to
Step 5).
F. Step 8: Prioritize Risks
In the last step, risks are prioritized on the basis of their
severity as indicated by the public security catalogs (arrow
from catalogs to Step 8). These risks affect the priority of
requirements to be satisfied (arrow from Step 8 to Steps 1–4).
When the residual risks are deemed to be acceptable given the
limitation of development resources, the system has reach the
level of good-enough security.
G. Discussion
Fig. 4 illustrates how elements from risk assessment, used
in the RISA method, fit into the inner argument schema, as
presented in Fig. 2. Unlike the traditional process of argumen-
tation (based on Toulmin’s practical argumentation [1]), that
is intrinsically performed in depth-first as a dialog (Fig. 2), ar-
gumentation based on risk assessment is performed in breath-
first. Each of these approaches have advantages (discussed in
Section VI) but, typically, in risk assessment two rounds of
argumentation are performed at the same cycle: one is related
to risks that rebut outer arguments, and the other is related to
mitigations which counter those risks.
Therefore, risks regarding all behavioral premises are identi-
fied and classified in terms of those that should be mitigated by
the system and those that should be mitigated by the context,
and prioritized on the basis of the severity of the risk they
represent, providing input to the next round of argumentation.
Mitigate risks
R1.2
R1.1
M2.1
M2.2
R3.2
R3.2
risks
R1.2
R1.1 risks
M2.1
M2.2
R3.2
R3.2
mitigations mitigations
risks risks
ground claim/
ground
claim/
ground
Prioritize
risks
Identify and
classify risks
Identify and
classify risks
Fig. 4. Risk-based inner argumentation
The recursiveness of the inner argumentation is represented
by the indirect connection between Step 5 and Step 7, which
involves the process of finding mitigations to risks, and the
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direct connection between Step 7 and Step 5, which involves
the process of finding new risks in mitigations.
Public catalogs provide input for all steps in risk assess-
ment, except for Step 6, which has to be done by domain
experts relying on the knowledge of the exact requirements.
In the RISA method, we use CAPEC and CWE to feed the
identification of risks with descriptions and information about
known attack patterns and weaknesses in software. They can
also provide information on how these attacks and weaknesses
can be mitigated, and empirical values indicating the severity
that allow the prioritization of risks. In some case, in-house
security catalogs may supplement public security catalogs.
Since these risks are attached to arguments and security
requirements, prioritizing risks indirectly results in the priori-
tization of arguments and security requirements.
V. THE PED EXAMPLE
This section describes a step-by-step application of RISA
to the PED example.
A. Satisfaction of Security Requirements
The system under analysis is the PED; it consists of four
main components: card-reader, keypad, display and CPU.
1) Step 1—Identify Functional Requirements: The overall
functional goal of the system in relation to PED users is the
following:
[FG1]: Provide convenient payment option at Points-Of-Sale to
consumers
The following functional requirement can be derived from
the functional goal above:
[FR1]: Allow consumers to pay at Points-Of-Sale with PIN
2) Step 2—Identify Security Goals: Obviously, the cus-
tomers’ PIN is the most valuable asset in this case. Protecting
the PIN is important not only because of the potential financial
impact on the customers, but also because of the substantial
negative impact it will have on the reputation of the banking
authorities [14], and the PED manufacturers. Card details,
stored in smartcards, are also relevant assets; their value
comes from the possibility to fake the magnetic-strip on the
smartcards [6]. Other assets involved with the PED system
include: transaction value, design characteristics, the smartcard
itself, and cryptographic keys. For the illustration of our
analysis, here we focus on PIN as the primary asset.
3) Step 3—Identify Security Requirements: As mentioned
earlier, security requirements are viewed as constraints on
the system functional requirements according to its functional
goals. In this case, such a composition produces the following
two security requirements:
[SR1]: PIN entered by consumers shall remain confidential
during payment transactions at Points-Of-Sale
[SR2]: PIN entered by consumers shall remain accurate during
payment transactions at Points-Of-Sale
According to the documentation available about the PED
system (e.g. [6], [14]), these two requirements are satisfied by
implementing the following security functions:
[SF1]: Enclosure of PED components provides tamper detec-
tion and response mechanisms to resist physical attacks
[SF2]: Encryption/Decryption of PIN ensures that the PIN is
encrypted within the PED immediately after the PIN entry is
complete
These security functions correspond with the “require-
ments” A1.1 and C2, extracted from the PED security require-
ments document from Mastercard [15].
The system context, W in the entailment (1), is then
elaborated. The functional requirement of the PED helps us to
delimit the context; from “payment transaction using a PED”
we identify five domains: customer, card, merchant, terminal
and bank. Using a slightly modified version of the notation
used by the Problem Frames approach [10], Fig. 5 shows the
context of the PED system and its security requirements. The
notation is unusual in two ways: (i) it treats the PED system
as a machine with its own components, and (ii) causality in
shared phenomena is indicated by directed arrows.
Notice that the diagram shows the shared phenomena related
not only to PIN, but also to the card details and the transaction
value, which are all relevant to the payment transactions using
the PED system.
In terms of PIN, the diagram illustrates the behavior already
described in Section II, namely that “Cardholders [consumers]
typically insert their cards . . . into the PED’s card-reader
interface, enter their PIN using the PED’s keypad, and confirm
the transaction value via a display on the PED itself”. Note that
the action performed by consumers to insert their cards into
the card-reader is not represented explicitly in the diagram.
The PED system has two possible main usage scenarios.
It can be used at the Points-Of-Sales either connected to a
terminal or stand-alone. The former case is often found in
supermarkets, once the merchant scans products, their value
get registered by the terminal; at the end, the terminal sends
the value of the transaction to the PED that displays it to the
customer. The latter case is often found in restaurants: the
merchant enters the transaction value directly into the PED
via the keypad and the PED displays it to the customer.
The card details flow from their initial location (the card)
along with the PIN and the transaction value until they reach
the bank for approval.
The shared phenomena from the context diagram related to
the PIN are detailed using the following convention: an arrow
from a domain A annotated with phenomenon b is written as
A!b.
• consumer!PIN: consumer enters PIN
• keypad!PIN: keypad sends PIN to the card-reader
• card-reader!PIN: card-readers sends PIN to the card
• card!confirmation-PIN-ok: card requests confirmation
that PIN is ok to the card-reader
• card-reader!PIN-confirmed(PIN,card-details): card-
reader sends confirmation that PIN is ok to the PED
CPU
• CPU!authorization-request(PIN,value,card-details):
CPU sends request for authorization of payment
transaction to bank
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Fig. 5. System context of the PED system and its security requirements
• bank!confirmation-transaction: bank sends confirma-
tion (positive or negative) of transaction to the PED CPU
4) Step 4—Construct Outer Arguments: The behavior of
the PIN needs to guarantee that:
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, A7 ` bank!confirmation-transaction
The premises are defined below using the propositional
logic.
Premises:
P1. consumer!PIN → keypad!PIN
P2. keypad!PIN → card-reader!PIN
P3. card-reader!PIN → card!confirmation-PIN-ok
P4. card!confirmation-PIN-ok → card-reader!PIN-confirmed
P5. card-reader!PIN-confirmed → CPU!authorization-request
P6. CPU!authorization-request → bank!confirmation-transac-
tion
Triggering assumption:
A7. consumer!PIN holds
Conclusions:
C8. keypad!PIN (Detach,P1,A7)
C9. card-reader!PIN (Detach,P2,C8)
C10. card!confirmation-PIN-ok (Detach,P3,C9)
C11. card-reader!PIN-confirmed (Detach,P4,C10)
C12. CPU!authorization-request (Detach,P5,C11)
C13. bank!confirmation-transaction (Detach,P6,C12)
Assuming that the phenomena in behavioral premises (P1–
P6) are triggered in sequence, context is correct and later
implementation of the PED does not introduce deviations from
the behavior specified, this proof means that, in principle,
the PED behavior (i.e., the PED with its security functions
under its context) can satisfy both security requirements (SR1:
confidentiality of PIN, and SR2: accuracy of PIN) while
meeting its own functional requirement (FR1). It proves that
the entailment (1) can be fulfilled for the PED example.
However, the proof premises (P1-P6) and triggering assump-
tion (A7) can be challenged in practice. If any of these can
be challenged effectively, the result could represent a non-
satisfaction of entailment (1) for the PED example.
B. Risk assessment for inner arguments
The premises (P1–P6) and trigerring assumption (A7) of
the outer argument, the output of the previous step, provides
a structure for assessing risks. The following discussion will
focus on risks related to SR1 only.
1) Step 5—Identify Risks: This activity aims to identify
the risks related to the security requirement SR1 that could
rebut all the premises and trigerring assumptions carried over
from the outer argument. Supported by the CAPEC and CWE
security catalogs, the activity involves searching for catalog
entries that represent a risk to the claim of each premise,
including the triggering assumption. For example, what has to
be challenged for premise “P1: consumer!PIN → keypad!PIN”
is the confidentiality of customers’ PIN (SR1). This involves:
(i) the confidentiality of the PIN as it is entered by consumers
(A7), and (ii) the confidentiality of the PIN from the moment it
is entered by customers until it reaches the keypad. Therefore,
these two aspects drive the analysis of risks which can rebut
P1. As illustrated in Fig. 6, risks identified for P1, given A7,
allow us to evaluate the satisfaction of conclusion C8 of the
outer argument for SR1. Similar rationale applies to P2-P6.
inner argumentation 
for conclusion about C9
of the outer argument
confidentiality
risks to
confidentiality
risks to
inner argumentation 
for conclusion about C10
of the outer argument
R1.5
R1.1
...
...
R1.6
R1.9
leaves keypad
keypad (P1)/ PIN
(P2)
PIN reaches
card−reader (P2)/
card−reader (P3)
PIN leaves
PIN reachesCustomer initiates
transaction and 
enters PIN (A7)
of the outer argument
for conclusion about C8
inner argumentation 
Fig. 6. Behavioral premises of the PED system to be challenged via risk-
based inner argumentation
Table I lists the risks identified for premises P1 and P2
with references to CAPEC and CWE entries. It also contains
some references marked with the symbol ?, indicating the
CAPEC/CWE entries that are related to the risk but are
currently incomplete to be useful. Since these catalogs are
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constantly evolving it is important to keep them for future
reference.
TABLE I
IDENTIFICATION OF RISKS FOR PREMISES P1 AND P2
Challenged Risk Reference
Premise P1 R1.1: consumer is triggered to
reveal PIN via social engineer-
ing attack
CAPEC-403?
Premise P1 R1.2: PIN is revealed by miss-
ing PIN field masking
CWE-549
Premise P1 R1.3: PIN is revealed by brute
forcing attack
CAPEC-49,
CAPEC-70 &
CAPEC-112
Premise P1 R1.4: PIN is revealed due to
lack of aging policy
CWE-262
Premise P1 R1.5: PIN is collected by fake
PED set to allow pharming at-
tack
CAPEC-89
Premise P2 R1.6: PIN is revealed if sent
unencrypted within the PED
and PED enclosure can be tam-
pered
CWE-311 &
CAPEC-436?
Premise P2 R1.7: PIN is revealed if sent
encrypted within the PED but
PED enclosure can be tam-
pered
CAPEC-20 &
CWE-327 &
CAPEC-436?
Premise P2 R1.8: PIN is revealed via snif-
fer installed by PED adminis-
trators
CAPEC-65
Premise P2 R1.9: Unauthorized access to
PIN is concealed via log
injection-tampering-forging by
PED administrators
CAPEC-93
2) Step 6—Classify Risks: We classify risks according to
two types of risk treatments.
A risk is classified as “transfer risk” if it is assumed
that context domains, involved in ensuring the satisfaction
of the entailment (1), will be responsible for its mitigation.
Identifying such class of risks is important for two reasons:
it allows different parties in the PED context domains to be
made explicitly accountable for the mitigation of the identified
risks, and it allows regulations to be enforced, as discussed by
Anderson [16].
A risk is classified as “mitigate risk” if it is assumed that the
system will be responsible for its mitigation. The classification
of risks from Table I is shown in Table II. Note that this table
illustrates with R1.7 that a same risk can be classified in both
classes. Typically, risks classified under “mitigate risk” contain
brief descriptions of mitigations in the format of requirements.
Mitigations described in this table were mostly retrieved
from best practices solutions and mitigations described in
the CAPEC and CWE entries mentioned in Table I. For
example, CWE-311 (reference for risk R1.6), entitled “Missing
Encryption of Sensitive Data” discusses potential mitigations
for this weakness in terms of different phases of the software
life cycle. Under Phase:Requirements, we find the description
of mitigation “Any transmission of PIN should use well-vetted
encryption algorithms”, which is presented in Table II.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS FOR PREMISES P1 AND P2
Risk Risk treatment
R1.1 Transfer risk: assumed consumers take mitigations
R1.2 Mitigate risk: PED should obfuscate display of PIN
as entered by consumers in keypad
R1.3 Transfer risk: assumed banks (e.g., require strong PIN
policy) and customers (e.g., avoid common, guessable
PIN) take mitigations
R1.4 Transfer risk: assumed banks and card issuers (e.g.,
require PIN changes and renew cards periodically) take
mitigations
R1.5 Mitigate risk: PED should (i) use authentication
mechanisms, and (ii) auditing mechanism to log au-
thorized replacements
R1.6 Mitigate risk: Any transmission of PIN should use
well-vetted encryption algorithms
R1.7 Mitigate risk: (i) encryption of PIN should use ac-
cepted algorithms and recommended key sizes, (ii)
cryptographic keys should be managed and protected
(Transfer risk: assumed cards will also comply with
this mitigation), (iii) PED design should allow upgrade
of cryptographic algorithms
R1.8 Mitigate risk: Any transmission of PIN should be
encrypted
R1.9 Mitigate risk: PED should provide access control to
physical log files
3) Step 7—Mitigate Risks: Only those risks classified as
“mitigate risks” are over to this stage. This step involves a
cross-analysis of mitigations identified for each risk during
the classification activity (Table II), in order to obtain a
consolidated list of mitigations, as shown in Table III. Note
that risks R1.1., R1.3 and R1.4 are not present in the table.
TABLE III
MITIGATIONS OF RISKS IDENTIFIED FOR P1 AND P2
Risk Mitigation
R1.2 M2.1: PED should obfuscate display of PIN as
entered by consumers in keypad
R1.5 M2.2: PED should use authentication mechanisms
R1.5 M2.3: PED should have auditing mechanism to log
authorized replacements
R1.6 &
R1.7 &
R1.8
M2.4: Any transmission of PIN should use well-
vetted encryption algorithms and recommended
key sizes
R1.7 M2.5: Cryptographic keys should be managed and
protected
R1.7 M2.6: PED design should allow upgrade of cryp-
tographic algorithms
R1.9 M2.7: PED should provide access control to phys-
ical log files
The table shows that mitigation M2.4 counters risks R1.6,
R1.7 and R1.8, and that risk R1.7 is countered by mitigations
M2.4, M2.5 and M2.6.
4) Step 8—Prioritize Risks: This step involves retrieving
from the CAPEC and CWE entries indicating the severity of
risks identified, as shown in Table IV.
This table makes it evident that this analysis only gives
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a rough impression about severity and that we are again
confronted with incomplete information, which often happens
in security practice. It also becomes apparent that, because
several CAPEC and CWE entries may refer to the same risk,
we may obtain in the end a lower bound and an upper bound
on risk severity. In this case, a decision should be made
about the strategy to follow depending on several factors, such
as attitude towards risk (e.g., risk-averse, risk-taking or in-
between), security-criticality of the system, and so on. For
example, from a risk-averse point-of-view, we consider M2.2,
M2.3 and M2.4 as priority over the others.
Recursion of Inner Arguments Mitigations may also
introduce new risks, so for each mitigation in Table III a new
iteration of Step 5 may be required. These iterations stop when
the system security is considered good enough, i.e. the residual
risks are considered acceptable, and the resources for security
analysis have been used (e.g., deadline or budget have been
reached).
For example, if we take mitigation M2.3 which is related
to the very high severity risk R1.5 (Table IV), we can see
that this risk refers to the possibility of pharming attacks
(Table I). According to CAPEC-89, a pharming attack occurs
“when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into
supposedly trusted locations”. This risk challenges the premise
P1, which refers to the PIN shared between consumer and
keypad (Fig. 5). Since SR1 is about the confidentiality of
PIN, the risk assessment suggests that the pharming attack is a
rebuttal to the security argument of SR1. The risk assessment
further indicates that one way to mitigate this risk is by
introducing an auditing mechanism for the keypad (Table III).
This new round of rebuttal to the premises of the security
argument, and a mitigation to the rebuttal are obtained from
the risk assessment.
VI. RELATED WORK & DISCUSSION
A. Risk in Requirements Engineering
In requirements engineering literature, the issue of risks
has been considered in two related yet distinct ways: project
risks and system risks. Project risks are related to the process
of software development and factors that may contribute to
the failure and success of the project. Several factors may be
related to the project risks, including requirements creep [17],
[18], requirements negotiation and project estimates [18], and
TABLE IV
PRIORITIZATION OF RISKS FOR PREMISES P1 AND P2
Mitigation Risk Typical risk severity
M2.1 R1.2 no indication in the CWE
M2.2 R1.5 very highM2.3 R1.5
M2.4 R1.6 &
R1.7 &
R1.8
low to very high (depending on specifics
of different attacks)
M2.5 R1.7 low to high (depending on specifics of
different attacks)M2.6 R1.7
M2.7 R1.9 high
project resources. System risks are related to the behavior of
the software system that may contribute to the system satis-
fying or not satisfying the requirements. Factors contributing
to system risks include missing or incorrect requirements and
domain assumptions [19].
Threat modeling for the elicitation of security requirements
has been extensively researched in the domain of requirements
engineering. Published approaches include: misuse cases [20],
abuse cases [21], attack trees [22], abuse frames [23], anti-
goals [24], and combinations of these [25]. These approaches
overlap only partially with the RISA method, mainly in the
activity of risk identification. In this activity, they may provide
a more in-depth analysis of specific issues/scenarios, therefore,
in this sense they complement RISA. However, they lack the
advantage of argumentation to allow validation of security
requirements satisfaction and of maintaining the focus of
security on the system as a whole.
B. Structured Argumentation
Argumentation provides a rationale to convince an audi-
ence that a claim should be considered valid. Three qualities
are often discussed in the informal argumentation literature:
convincingness, soundness, and completeness. Convincingness
relates to whether the argumentation is compelling enough to
assure an intended audience that the conclusion reached is
reasonable [4]. Soundness relates to whether the argumenta-
tion fulfills the argumentation schema and is based on “true
premises” [26]. Completeness relates to whether nothing has
been omitted that could lead to a different conclusion about a
claim [26], [27].
A known problem in argumentation is the subjectivity in-
volved in identifying arguments and counterarguments (which
relates to soundness), and the difficulty in determining com-
pleteness. Proposals to reduce these problems rely on the help
of: (i) pre-defined critical questions [28], [29], (ii) what-if
scenarios [30], (ii) expert assurance checks [26], (v) guide-
lines [31] or (vi) how/why questioning, as proposed in [4].
However, these approaches provide limited support and are
rather static, i.e. they do not evolve in the speed required to
assure good enough security of systems. The RISA method
reduces these problems by using ever evolving public catalogs,
updated from input by a pool of security experts from several
organizations4.
Since security involves uncertainty and incomplete informa-
tion, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to show satisfac-
tion of these qualities. Expert judgment is needed, probably
enhanced with peer review [26], to improve the quality of
good enough security argumentation. Nevertheless, the main
benefit of using argumentation is that, in contrast to an ad-
hoc approach, it structures the reasoning and exposes it to
criticism [26]. The RISA method contributes towards reducing
this gap because its risk-based argumentation is supported by
public catalogs which accumulate information about risks, best
practice mitigations and empirical severity values based on
input from a large community of security experts.
4http://cwe.mitre.org/community/index.html
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C. Traditional versus risk-based (security) argumentation
As mentioned in Section III, the process of argumentation
traditionally follows a depth-first style. It provides a neat
and intuitive view about the evolution of an argument in
the format of a debate between two opponents. It is well
suitable to be represented as a tree structure of arguments and
counterarguments.
This process of argumentation, however, is not suitable
when reasoning about practical security. For example, it often
happens that one mitigation counters several risks, one risk
challenges several premises, and several mitigations introduce
one same new risk as seen in Table III, Step 2. As a
result, rather than a tree, a more complex graph structure of
arguments is often needed. In those situations, a breath-first
style of argumentation based on risk assessment scales better.
The RISA method is designed for such practical needs, while
still providing the ability to reconstruct argument threads via
backward traceability. Thus it is possible to link mitigations
back to risks, then back to premises, which relate to the outer
arguments to be validated in the first place.
D. Risk Assessment
Three basic elements distinguish the risk-based security
argumentation method described in this paper from other
risk assessment frameworks: (i) it provides a rationale for a
systematic representation of system context from which the
behavior of the system is derived and the outer argument is
built, providing structure to the risk assessment part of the
method, (ii) it makes assumptions about domains of the system
context explicit via transferred risks, and (iii) it uses public
security catalogs to support the risk assessment.
Explicit Context. In the CORAS framework [32], context
is established by means of an asset diagram (CORAS Step
2) which contains all assets that are logically or physically
related to the system to be assessed. Assets that are directly
harmed as a consequence of an unwanted event affecting the
target of evaluation are considered as part of the system under
analysis: otherwise, they are considered as part of the system
context. The boundary between system and system context can
be further adjusted in CORAS (Step 3) after a preliminary
analysis of risks by means of “dependent diagrams” [33].
Context is delimited in the RISA method by means of the
system functional goal and security requirements, from which
context domains are derived. This allows us to relate the results
of risk assessment to the satisfaction of security requirements.
Other security risk assessment and evaluation
frameworks (e.g., CRAMM [34], ISO 27005:2008 [35],
AS/NZS4360:2004 [36], and Common Criteria [8]) do not
prescribe any representation or delimitation rationale for
context specification; context is often described in natural
language.
Assumptions as Risk. Among the above mentioned risk
assessment and evaluation frameworks, the Australian/New
Zealand Standard (AS/NZS4360:2004 [36]) is the only which
conveys explicitly the idea that assumptions represent risks.
It prescribes that assumptions should be recorded and clearly
stated but, most importantly, mandates sensitivity analysis to
test the effect of uncertainty in assumptions. The current RISA
method does not incorporate validation of assumptions made
about the system context but it classifies them as risks to be
transferred. We plan to further study risks transferred and how
they affect the satisfaction of security requirements as future
work.
Evolving & Detailed Source of Information. The CORAS
framework [32] uses the guidelines in ISO 27001:2008 [35]
to support risk assessment. CRAMM [34] is supported by a
proprietary database of security controls that are traceable to
risks derived also from the ISO 27001:2008 [35]. Although
ISO 27001 is publicly available, it is a static document and do
not provide the level of details provided by CAPEC and CWE
catalogs. However, both CAPEC and CWE, at their current,
still need a lot of improvements, specially in their searching
capabilities; this is an area that has started to receive attention
from researchers, see e.g. [37].
Specific RISA steps, such as “Identify Risks” and “Mitigate
Risks”, could be supported by other risk assessment frame-
works such as the model-based approach of CORAS which
uses icons instead of tables. However, although it may improve
the friendliness of RISA, the traceability of several rounds of
argumentation may become more complex.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Although absolute security is not possible in practice,
security requirements still have to be satisfied to the extent
allowed by incomplete information, uncertainty and limited
resources. When dealing with practical security, requirements
engineers need to reason about how good security is enough.
That reasoning, almost by definition, involves risk assessment.
Extending an existing work on argumentation for security,
the proposed RISA method has shown how argumentation
can be extended with risk assessment thereby exploiting the
ability to identify, classify, mitigate and prioritize risks, and
feeding them back to the reasoning about the satisfaction of
the security requirements. RISA takes advantage of publicly
available databases of common attacks and weaknesses, thus
a degree of objectivity can be achieved in the risk assessment.
Nevertheless, subjectivity is not completely eliminated by
CWE/CAPEC; their evaluation of intrinsic risk severity is an
example. However, one positive aspect is the fact that this
evaluation is prone to scrutiny by security experts from the
community.
Our most pressing focus of future work is validation.
We have demonstrated an application of RISA to a realistic
example of PIN Entry Device. We are planning to apply the
RISA method to significant industrial case studies, including
the Air Traffic Management system [38]. Besides, we see two
main directions of future work which complement each other:
enhancements to the prioritization of risks and mitigations,
consequently reflecting on the prioritization of arguments, and
tool support.
In the current version of the RISA method, prioritization of
risks is qualitative, therefore coarse grained, and is detached
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from context. We believe that the Common Weakness Scoring
System [39], which is another recent initiative related to the
CWE, may be valuable towards a more systematic quantitative
prioritization of risks taking into account factors related, e.g.,
to security concerns particular to a business domain and tech-
nology used. Prioritization could also be enhanced by incorpo-
rating cost/benefit trade-off considerations (as in [40]) about
mitigations, rather than only about risks. Finally, uncertainty
is another important aspect to be added into prioritization:
early work on Probabilistic Argumentation [41] seems to be a
promising starting point in this direction.
Decision making tool support would greatly improve the
practical use of the RISA method. We plan to investigate how
to provide effective automated reasoning about security re-
quirements, based on feedback from risk-based argumentation.
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